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Children as Witnesses:
What We Hear Them Say May Not Be What They Mean
David B. Battin & Stephen J. Ceci

C

hildren present a special challenge
when they become participants in
the legal system. Jean Piaget said
that the work of a child is to play. That is
the basis for most interactions between
children and adults. The child plays and
the consequences of that play are unimportant to adult affairs—that is, unless
the child is under the age of 6 or 7 and is
required to serve as a witness. In that situation the consequences of what the
child says or chooses not to say can be
truly significant.
The special challenge for adults hearing the child’s testimony is to accurately
infer what the child means from the
words that are used. Entertaining the
possibility that the child could intend to
convey a meaning different from—and
even opposite to—what a legally trained
listener would mean using the same
words is crucial to maximizing the value
of the child’s testimony.
The child witness presents a double
bind for those conducting a forensic
interview. Young children produce a
higher percentage of accurate and relevant information in a free recall situation
in which they are merely asked to tell in
their words everything they remember,
without prompts, cues, or suggestions.
However, preschoolers produce little or
no information when simply asked to
“tell us what you remember.” The aggravation of this situations stems from the
demonstrated inability of these very
young children to use questions posed to
them as clues to what additional information is needed.
In a recent experimental investigation
of children’s reports of a wrongful act
they had seen on videotape, most children aged 3 to 10 years made a first reference to the perpetrator, who acted alone,
as “they.” In adult usage, “they” almost
always indicates more than one person.
The older children in this study were able
to refine their reference in response to
directive questions such as, “Do you
know which person did it?,” but a signif4 Court Review - Spring 2003

icant number of preschoolers never made
a singular reference.
Most interrogative experiences that
children have outside the legal system are
not carefully evaluated for consistency or
truth value. The adult who asks questions such as “What happened at daycare
today?” or “What did you do at Molly’s
birthday party?” have a “script” in mind
of what occurs during the typical event
(e.g., a typical birthday party or a typical
day at nursery school). Anything the
child says that fits the script goes unchallenged. It is usually not important to the
adult questioner whether the child
played with Legos today or on some
other day, or whether the child played
with Legos himself or watched a peer
play with them.
Courtroom communication differs
from everyday conversation in that it is
designed to promote shared context to a
very high degree. The codes and statutes
are available for everyone to read.
Evidence is shared through discovery.
Jurisprudence is an unusual venue that
employs the same language (i.e., semantics, syntax, and pragmatics) that is used
for other communication but often
defines terms differently and provides
exact and special meaning to words in the
general lexicon. This prescribed and
delimited mutual context facilitates the
process for those with access to it.
This is precisely why communication
between those trained in the law and
those without legal training can go awry.
Recognizing that even non-indoctrinated
adults have a high degree of variability in
their success with this system, children
are at a profound disadvantage. They not
only lack this specialized knowledge, but
they lack substantial general knowledge
of the world and certain language skills
we expect in adults. They are less likely
to admit they don’t understand a question, to correct an adult if the child’s
answer is misinterpreted, or to admit
they don’t know the answer to a question.
Perhaps the most obvious way that

communication can break down with
children is in semantics or word meaning. If a child is asked, “What color
jacket was the lady wearing?,” and she
answers, “Blue,” without hesitation, then
it is easy to accept that answer at face
value. Most three- and four-year-olds
know the names of all the primary colors,
but the percentage of those children who
can accurately match a color name to its
corresponding hue increases dramatically
between 36 months and 60 months.
Prepositions such as above, below,
behind, in front of, on, before, and after are
familiar to three- and four-year-olds, but
a significant percentage of these children
confuse the physical or temporal relationship represented by these words.
Prepositions such as on, with, and to have
multiple meanings, some of which are
acquired years before others. For example, the sense of on that locates an object
in space (“The book is on the table.”) is
acquired prior to the sense of on that
shows connections or relations between
things (“Did he have on his pajamas?”).
In turn, both these senses of the preposition are acquired years before the sense
that carries the meaning of an agent or
action (“Show me on the doll how he
touched you.”). The risk for a forensic
interviewer is to assume that the child
understands a question with a given word
because the word, although in her vocabulary, is not understood in the way the
interviewer employs it.
When it comes to temporal terms, the
situation is even dodgier. A child might
assent to the question, “Did that happen
before your birthday?” when the child’s
birthday is in July. Yet, the same child
might subsequently answer the question,
“Tell us again when that happened?”
with, “In August.” For many three- and
four-year-olds this couplet of answers
would not present a contradiction.
These examples illustrate the critical
bind encountered by those interviewing
young children. There is extensive scientific evidence that children provide the

most accurate information in a free recall
situation in which they are asked to tell
what they know about a situation without additional prompting from the interviewer. Unfortunately, most young children do not provide sufficient details
about events to allow a naïve listener to
reconstruct the episode. This is true even
in experimental situations that have been
designed to present the child with a relatively simple scenario, people with highly
salient physical characteristics, and a single salient event.
Presented with claims such as, “They
did something bad,” the interviewer is
compelled to resort to directive questions
to find out what was done and who did it.
As the interview proceeds and the child
asserts, “The lady did it,” directive questions with fewer options for response
need to be presented. If, in response to
the question, “Do you know what the
lady was wearing?,” the child says, “A
coat,” the stage has been set for the color
question, which the child recognizes
requires a single-word answer with a
finite set of options.
This bind becomes a double bind
when the witness is only three or four
years old. These children will predictably
provide the least information in free
recall—in our work, many often produce
no information at all. In addition, there
is a body of converging evidence that
these very young children lack the pragmatic skill to use the interviewer’s questions as evidence that they need to supply
more information. In the study mentioned earlier, three- and four-year-olds
produced response patterns during interviews that indicated they were not
responding to directive questions at all.
After asserting, “They did it,” successive
questions about who “did it” were
responded to with “the people,” “they,”
“those guys,” etc. Some of these children
eventually identified “they” as either a
solo man or a woman, illustrating the

very real risk that young preschoolers
will use a plural pronoun even though
they know an individual person is
responsible. Interestingly, very few of the
children in our study initially used clothing or other physical characteristics to
identify a singular definite reference (e.g.,
the man with the white shirt). One can
imagine the suspicions of a forensic interviewer when a child witness asserts that a
crime was perpetrated by “they” rather
than “he”—a barrage of follow-up questions to elicit possible unindicted perpetrators. Yet, it is a common characteristic
of preschoolers to mislabel singular perpetrators with a plural noun or pronoun.
Transcripts of depositions and incourt testimony include copious examples of exchanges in which children fail
to recognize potential ambiguity. For
instance, children often answer embedded questions such as, “Did you or did
you not…?” with “Yes” or “No.”
Children try to answer the questions that
are posed to them, even when they are
not precisely sure what information is
being requested. In such situations, the
miscommunication problem can be
masked by the adult assumption that
what people say is going to be relevant.
Most conversational responses could be
interpreted in a variety of ways if they
were context free. The success of communication requires that we interpret
what is said as if it is relevant in the present discourse context. If the context of
very young children is characteristically
divergent from the adult context, that
interpretation may be in error.
The key to anticipating the problems
in adult-child communication is to recognize that the child’s perspective is vastly
different from that of an adult. They have
less knowledge of the world, alternative
meanings for common words, different
responses to unknown versus powerful
people, less ability to reconstruct past
events in situ, and highly differential

approaches to using what is said to them
to evaluate what their discourse participant knows or does not know. Most children want to cooperate with an interviewer and will do their best to answer
the questions posed to them, with or
without understanding their import. It
seems incumbent on those charged with
the task of taking a statement from a
young child to be aware of these tendencies and to seek expert guidance in structuring their interview.
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